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    Abstract 
This article analyzes income redistribution in the inter-ethnic context. The model 
shows that redistribution in favor of less prosperous ethnic minorities raises fertility 
among the unskilled minority recipients, lowers fertility among the contributing local 
skilled, slows human capital accumulation, and reduces the per-capita output growth. 
The analysis also demonstrates that income redistribution, although financed by taxes 
levied on the skilled, generates a mechanism that, via its disincentive effect on 
human capital investment, works strongly against another weak segment of society – 
the local unskilled. This may provide a purely economic explanation for antipathy 
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 1.   Introduction 
This article analyzes income redistribution in the inter-ethnic context. It demonstrates that 
redistribution in favor of less prosperous ethnic minorities, although financed by taxes 
levied on the skilled, generates a mechanism that, via its disincentive effect on human 
capital investment, works strongly against the local unskilled. The paper suggests that, 
without referring to the popular racial argument, the very existence of such redistribution 
may provide a purely economic explanation for inter-ethnic tensions broadly observed in 
modern societies. Moreover, the negative effect of the redistribution on the local poor 
may also explain why antipathy toward minorities is particularly strong among less 
educated segments of the local population. 
The paper discusses the issue in the context of a growth model with endogenous 
fertility building on Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) and Azarnert (2004). The basic idea may 
be stated as follows. Consider an economy populated with two groups of local people: a 
group of the less prosperous unskilled and a group of the wealthier skilled. Along with 
the local population, the country contains an unskilled minority group. To compensate 
them for insufficient incomes, the minority unskilled receive financial support financed 
by taxes levied on the wealthier local skilled. The local unskilled, who earn lower wages 
than the skilled, are exempt from taxation, but, if they invest in human capital, they join 
the skilled and start paying taxes. This directly reduces their potential after-tax incomes 
and discourage them from acquiring human capital. Provided that children are viewed as 
a normal good for agents that belong to each group, income redistribution raises fertility 
among the unskilled minority recipients and lowers fertility among the contributing local 
skilled. When the number of skilled people grows slower, so does the total stock of 
human capital. This in turn reduces the output growth and the rate of increase in the 
return to human capital, via a human capital externality. This decline in the rate of 
increase of the pre-tax gross income of the skilled also negatively affects the 
lucrativeness of investment in human capital for the unskilled. As a consequence, the 
switch of the local poor to the skilled status is postponed and as a result they are 
unnecessarily trapped in poverty for a longer period of time.  
  The model rests upon the following observations that have been largely supported 
by empirical evidence:    2
(1) Over-representation of several minorities among welfare beneficiaries. 
The over-utilization of public assistance by immigrant minorities has been well 
documented by extensive research. For evidence from the United States, Germany, and 
Scandinavia see, for example, Borjas (1994; 1999), Borjas and Hilton (1996), Riphahn 
(2004), Hansen and Lofstrom (2003), Nannestad (2004), among many others. Higher 
welfare dependency of settled minorities has been also well observed. For example, as 
Borjas and Hilton (1996) report, in the early 1990s, as compared to native American 
Whites, native American Hispanics and blacks were more likely to participate in welfare 
programs 3 and 4 times, respectively. Alesina et al. (2000) found the use of public 
employment for the purpose of disguised income redistribution toward disadvantaged 
minorities. Moreover, in Europe, a considerable fraction of people who belong to ethnic 
minorities do not even participate in the labor market,
1 and among those who are enrolled 
in the labor force, unemployment is much higher than among the natives. 
(2) Differences in skills and economic outcomes between different ethnic groups. 
The existence of large wage differentials between different ethnic groups even 
after standardizing for observed skills has been well documented (e.g., Borjas, 1994, 
1999, among others). Within this context, Borjas (1994, p. 1714) concludes that "current 
immigration in the US and in many other  countries is setting the stage for ethnic 
differences in economic outcomes that are likely to be a dominant feature of labor market 
in these countries throughout the next century". The importance of ethnicity in the 
process of human capital accumulation has also been well established (e.g., Borjas, 
1992). More specifically, lower educational success of several minorities has been 
broadly documented as well. For example, Light and Strayer (2006) find that the US 
minorities, although are more likely than observably equivalent Whites to attend colleges, 
posses fewer favorable unobserved factors and as a result are less likely than their White 
counterparts to complete college. Riphahan (2003) finds that in Germany schooling 
successes of second-generation German-born Turkish immigrants lag behind those of 
natives, so that a group as a whole fails to assimilate to native educational standards and 
                                                  
1 As, for example, Nannestad (2004) reports, in Denmark more than 50% of nonwestern immigrants and 
their Danish-born descendants were outside the labor force in 2001. The most striking are the figures for 
Somalians and Palestinians, for whom labor market participation rates were only 14 and 26 percent, 
respectively.    3
increasingly falls behind. Huge gap in educational achievements between natives and 
second-generation nonwestern immigrants has been broadly observed in Denmark as well 
(e.g., Nannestad, 2004 and references therein). In addition, less educated minorities also 
demonstrate higher fertility levels as compared to locals.  
  This paper is chiefly related to the following three strands in the literature: (1) 
attitudes of natives toward minorities, (2) endogenous fertility and growth, (3) 
redistribution and growth. Within voluminous recent literature on ethnic diversity and its 
negative economic consequences, the present paper in close in spirit to the studies that 
analyze the formation of opinion and attitudes of natives toward minorities. In recent 
years, following dramatic changes in the pattern of international migration, research on 
race-related attitudes of native intensified (see, e.g., Dustmann and Preston (2001) for a 
list of recent empirical studies). Looking at cross-country survey data and at individual 
countries, these recent studies, such as, for example, Bauer et al. (2000), Dustmann and 
Preston (2001; 2006; 2007), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Gang et al. (2002), O'Rourke 
and Sinnott (2006) among others, separate racial and economic components of such 
attitudes and demonstrate the importance of both economic and non-economic factors in 
determining negative sentiments toward minorities that are on the rise in recent years. 
Leaving aside the important non-economic factors, such as, for instance, cultural and 
national identity concerns, in determining attitudes toward minority groups with largely 
different cultural background,
2 the present paper concentrates on purely economic 
reasons behind negative sentiments among natives toward ethnic minorities, either 
already settled, or still increasing their share in population through further immigration. It 
enriches this strand of the literature by establishing the novel channel through which the 
redistribution in favor of less prosperous ethnic minorities negatively affects the local 
poor, although they do not directly finance this redistribution. 
Voluminous growth literature with endogenous fertility has flourished recently.
3 
A prominent example is Galor and Weil (2000) who assumed that a rise in the rate of 
technological progress increases the rate of return to human capital, inducing parents to 
                                                  
2  The findings of recent empirical studies, e.g., Dustmann and Preston (2001), Gang et al. (2002), 
demonstrate that increasing concentration of ethnic minorities in local neighborhoods leads to more hostile 
attitudes toward minorities among the natives. 
3  See Galor (2005) for a survey. Additional references can be found in Azarnert (2006; 2008).    4
substitute child quality for child quantity. In this model, as in Galor and Weil (2000) as 
well as in Galor and Moav (2002) among many others, technological progress brings 
about an increase in the return to education, eventually inducing the poor to invest in 
education and switch to the skilled status. Income redistribution, however, makes this 
process slower and unnecessarily keeps the local poor in poverty for a longer period of 
time. Among other related studies, Moav (2005) explores the joint determination of 
fertility and education and offers an explanation for the persistence of poverty. In his 
model, the price of child quantity relative to that of child quality increases with an 
individual's labor income. As a result, the poor have a comparative advantage in child 
quantity, whereas the rich (educated) have a comparative advantage in the child quality. 
Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) show that the offspring of the unskilled parents find it 
lucrative to invest in human capital and then to decrease their optimal fertility only once 
the net income gap between the educated and the uneducated becomes high enough. De 
la Croix and Doepke (2003) concentrate on the fertility differential between the rich and 
the poor. They conclude that inequality affects economic growth negatively since poor 
parents who tend to have many children and provide little education have an impact on 
the future society's human capital that is larger than their current fraction in the 
population. Azarnert (2004) introduces an analysis of interactions between income 
redistribution, fertility and growth in an economy that operates in a global environment. 
Unlike previous studies in this context that do not consider inter-ethnic interactions, this 
work illustrates the important role of income redistribution in the determination of 
fertility differentials between different ethnic groups.  
A key issue in models that deal with redistribution and growth is whether more 
redistribution is beneficial or detrimental to investment and accumulation. In Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) and Person and Tabellini (1994), taxes reduce growth by decreasing the 
net return on capital. Galor and Tsiddon (1997) show that an economy that prematurely 
implements a policy designed to enhance equality in the distribution of income may be 
trapped unnecessarily at a low-output equilibrium without ever reaching prosperity. 
Orazem and Tesfatsion (1997) discuss the disincentive effect of income redistribution on 
children’s schooling effort. Banerjee (2004) argues that a proportional tax on human 
capital reduces human capital investment even if it is then redistributed as a lump-sum    5
educational subsidy. Azarnert (2004) concentrates on the effect of income redistribution 
on growth through the demographic channel. The present paper adds a multiethnic 
context and contributes to the existing literature on redistribution and growth by further 
investigation of the demographic implications of income redistribution that this strand of 
literature has yet to integrate. It also establishes the indirect effect of redistribution on the 
incentives of the group that is not directly involved in the redistribution as contributors or 
recipients. On the society-wide level, the analysis suggests that reductions in the burden 
of redistribution in favor of less prosperous ethnic minorities may help to slacken the 
negative pressure on educational incentives among the locals thereby increasing the 
supply of skilled labor and stimulating economic growth. 
 
 2.   The Structure of the Economy 
Consider an overlapping-generation economy in which agents live for two periods and 
capital flows freely at a fixed world interest rate r. In the first period of life, agents are 
children: each consumes a fixed quantity of his parents' time. Children can either perform 
simple tasks (unskilled work) or invest in human capital. In the second period of life they 
either benefit from higher income if they invest in human capital or work as unskilled 
workers for lower pay. In either case, they decide on the number of their offspring, 
become parents, and spend time bringing up their children. For simplicity, assume that 
agents consume only in the last period of life. 
  Alongside with the local population, the economy contains an unskilled minority 
group. Suppose the minority unskilled earn less than the local unskilled. To compensate 
them for insufficient incomes, the minority unskilled receive financial support financed 
by taxes levied on the wealthier local skilled. The local unskilled, who earn lower wages 
than the skilled, are exempt from taxation, but, if they invest in human capital, they join 
the skilled and start paying taxes.  The offspring of the minority unskilled who choose 
invest in human capital join the skilled and give up the subsidy. When the offspring of 
the minority unskilled become skilled, the redistribution ends. 
 
 2.1.   Production    6
In period  1 + t production of the same aggregate output is performed in two sectors. 
The unskilled produce using a linear technology and no capital: 
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where 
u
t L 1 +  is the number of the local unskilled workers in period  1 + t  and 
m
t L 1 +  is the 
number of the minority unskilled. The wage of a local unskilled worker is fixed at  ,
u w  
the wage of the minority unskilled worker is 
m w , and  .
u m w w <  
Production in the skilled sector uses two factors of production – capital and 
efficiency units of labor. The total number of efficiency units E in this sector is a 
weighted average of  ,
s E  
us E  and  ,
ms E  where the weights are the numbers of s-type 
individuals (skilled children of local skilled parents), us-type individuals (skilled children 
of local unskilled parents), and ms-type individuals (skilled children of the minority 
unskilled parents). I also assume that the skill premium for a child of a local skilled 
parent is higher than that for a child of a local unskilled parent, and that the skill premium 
for a child of a local unskilled parent is higher than the skill premium for a child of a 
minority unskilled parent. More specifically, when investing in human capital, the child 
of a skilled parent obtains 
s E efficiency units, while the skilled child of a local unskilled 
parent obtains 
us E units of efficiency, and the skilled child of an unskilled minority 
parent obtains only 
ms E  units of efficiency  ). (
ms us s E E E > >   
There are many explanations for this parental lead in education: informal 
education, cultural aspect, the time spent searching for a job or quality of the match. 
Whatever the reasons, the empirical significance of the parental effect has been widely 
documented (see, e.g., Becker and Tomes (1986), Altonji and Dunn (1996), Rubinstein 
and Tsiddon (2004), among others). Lower educational success of several minorities, 
(e.g., Riphahn, 2003; Nannestad, 2004; Light and Strayer, 2006), as well as the existence 
of large intergenerationally transmitted (e.g., Borjas, 1992) wage differentials between 
different ethnic groups (e.g., Borjas, 1994, 1999) has also been well documented.  
The production function in the skilled sector is thus 
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1
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j
t L 1 + is the 
total number of j-type adult individuals in the economy in period  . 1 + t  
The return to one unit of efficiency in the skilled sector equals: 
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  Suppose technological progress is a function of a past society-wide stock of 
human capital. To capture this effect, assume A is a function of the aggregate level of 
human capital in the economy in the previous period,  ). ( 1 t t E A A = +  Since human capital 
per educated person is fixed by construction of this model, an aggregate change comes 
out of an increase in the population of educated persons only, which is a Kremer-type 
assumption;  . 0 ) (   , 0 ) (   , 0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ ′ > ⋅ ′ > ⋅ A A A  
 
 2.2.    Tax-Transfer Scheme 
In this economy, the minority unskilled earn less than the local unskilled. To compensate 
for insufficient incomes, the minority unskilled receive income support financed by taxes 
levied on the wealthy local skilled. To specify the tax-transfer scheme, the following is 
assumed:
4 
 A1.   In period  , 1 + t  there is one common tax rate τ  levied on the skilled. 
 A2.  The proceeds are distributed proportionally to the number of the unskilled 
minority recipients. 
 
The scheme specified above yields that the sum of transfer an adult unskilled 
individual receives in period  1 + t  is  




















ϕ                                                          (4) 
where 
s
t L 1 +  is the number of skilled taxpayers (
us L  is positive at the date when the 
offspring of the local unskilled switch to the skilled status and is meaningless otherwise), 
m
t L 1 +  is the number of unskilled minority recipients, and τ  is the rate of tax.     8
In this model the rate of tax is exogenous, but it can be easily endogenized as, for 
instance, in Azarnert (2004) where the tax is determined by the opportunities for the 
skilled taxpayers abroad. It can be also assumed that in the starting period the rate of tax 
is set in such a manner, so as to assure that the total income of the minority unskilled, 
including the sum of transfer ( 1 + t ϕ ), does not exceed the labor income of the local 
unskilled. 
Given the assumption that all individuals in the minority group are alike, the 
redistribution will be abolished at a moment when children of the minority unskilled will 
find it profitable to invest in human capital and switch to skilled status. 
 
 2.3.    Utility Maximization 
Regardless of ethnicity, agents derive utility from consumption in the second period of 
life and from the number of their living children. There is no uncertainty. The utility 
function of an individual born at time t is 
       ), ln( ) ln( ) 1 ( 1 1 + + + − = t t t N C U β β                                                                               (5) 
where  1 + t C  is second-period consumption and  1 + t N  is the number of living children.
5 
  There are potentially five types of individuals: (1) s, the skilled offspring of the 
local skilled parents, (2) u, the local unskilled, (3) us, the skilled offspring of the local 
unskilled parents, (4) m, the minority unskilled, and (5) ms, the skilled offspring of the 
minority unskilled. 
  An individual's lifetime income is allocated between consumption and 
childrearing. The cost of rearing children is measured in terms of work time foregone, at 
δ per child. Given the tax-transfer scheme specified in Section 2.2, the budget constraint 
for each type of individuals is respectively: 
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4 The impact of tax-benefit system on fertility has been well documented empirically. See, e.g., Whittington 
et al. (1990), Whittington (1992), Zhang et al. (1994), Gauthier and Hatzius (1997), Milligan (2005). 
5 Since the parental effect exists in human capital, a parental care for the well being of their offspring is not 
necessary in this context.    9
Each individual maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint. He has two 
decision variables – consumption and the number of children. For each generation t, the 
optimal level of each choice variable is 
      1 1 ) 1 ( + + − = t t I C β    
     
  ,
.                                  ,
   ,
) 1 (











































































           (7) 
Using (7), the (indirect) utility function at the optimum is 
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 2.4.    Investment in Human Capital 
Each individual has one unit of time in each period of life. It can be used either for 
education or work. As specified in Section 2.1, there exists a wedge in the return to 
investment in human capital  ) (
ms us s E E E > >  that is assumed to be sufficiently large. 
Since the parental effect in human capital is assumed to be strong enough and the rate of 
tax is assumed to be not too high, the offspring of skilled parents always invest in 
education. The offspring of unskilled parents decide in the first period whether or not to 
invest in human capital. An individual who chooses to invest in education spends all his 
working time in the first period of life at school and pays for that education a constant 
fraction of the gross skilled wage h = .
s w θ  There are no restrictions on borrowing at a 
fixed interest rate r. In the second period an adult individual works as a skilled worker, 
earning 
s w per one unit of efficiency he obtained. As long as the redistribution exists, a 
local skilled individual pays a fraction τ  of his labor income in taxes. A local individual 
who does not invest in human capital engages in unskilled labor in both periods of his life 
and earns 
u w each period. A minority individual who does not invest in human capital    10
engages in unskilled labor each period, earns each period 
m w  and receives income 
support (ϕ ) in the second period. A minority agent who invests in education spends all 
his time at school in the first period, pays 
s w θ  for that education, earns 
s w  per each unit 
of efficiency in the second period and gives up the subsidy. 
Given the tax-transfer scheme, as specified in Section 2.2, for each type of 
individuals born at period t, the whole lifetime income in terms of second period is one of 
the following forms: 
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According to Eq. (8), for each generation t, the utility for each type of individuals 
is 
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t U U + + >  children of local unskilled parents decide to remain 
unskilled. Once this inequality is reversed (or turned into equality), children of local 




t U U + + >  the 
offspring of the minority unskilled choose to remain unskilled. 
 
 2.5.    Fertility Choice 
From Eq. (7), for a given tax rate  , τ  one can calculate the number of children per parent 
for each type of parents. Denoting by 
j
t N 1 +  the number of offspring of a parent born in 
period t, where j = s, u, m, us, ms, these numbers are 
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Fertility choice of unskilled minority individuals depends on the transfer payments they 
receive. Given Eq. (4), it is 
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  As I show below in Section 2.6, at some point it becomes lucrative for the 
offspring of the minority unskilled to give up their subsidy and switch to skilled status. 
Given the tax-transfer scheme, as specified in Section 2.2, at this moment taxation is 
abandoned. Hence, fertility for ms-type individuals is 
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Accordingly, reproduction rate of the local skilled parents comes back to its natural level: 
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  Comparing the number of offspring for all of the groups in the case without 
redistribution and the corresponding numbers of offspring in the case under discussion, 
one can compute fertility gaps that appear due to redistribution.
6  
Whereas the ‘under-fertility’ among the local skilled of s- and us-types is 


























N     where  , ,ms s j =                                                        (17) 
the ‘over-fertility’ among the minority unskilled is 
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The main result of this section is thus immediately clear. Redistribution policy in 
favor of the minority unskilled, financed by taxes levied on the local skilled, raises 
fertility among the minority recipients and lowers fertility among the contributing local    12
skilled. Moreover, as shown in Eq. (17), since  ,
us s E E >  the under-fertility among local 
skilled whose parents were unskilled is higher than the under-fertility among local skilled 
whose parents were skilled. 
 
 2.6.   The Dynamic Path 
In order to examine the dynamic behavior of the economy, I first characterize the process 
of human capital accumulation. Next, since  ,
ms us E E >  I analyze the behavior of the 
corresponding groups consecutively.  
 
 2.6.1.   Step1:   Human Capital Accumulation Dynamics 
Consider first the dynamics of human capital accumulation. Provided that children are 
viewed as a normal good, once the redistribution starts, taxation lowers fertility among 
the contributing skilled. When the number of skilled people grows slower, so does the 
total stock of human capital. Given the structure of the skilled sector (Eq. 3), this in turn 




 2.6.2.   Step2:     The Offspring of Local Unskilled Parents 
In contrast to the offspring of the local skilled who always invest in education, the 
offspring of the local unskilled do not invest in human capital as long as the following 
inequality holds: 
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Once this inequality is reversed (or turns into equality), children of local unskilled parents 
choose to switch to skilled status. 
                                                                                                                                                  
6   In the absence of redistribution  ), 0 ( = ϕ  m-type fertility is  ). 2 )( ( r N
m + = δ β  
7 An assumption that  ()
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t w r w θ δ β rules out the possibility of negative growth.    13
  As one can immediately observe, their decision depends on the taxes levied on the 
skilled. Re-arranging Eq. (20), the necessary and sufficient condition for the offspring of 
the local unskilled to invest in human capital and switch to the skilled status is 































w E              (20) 
Notice that in any period  1 + t  the RHS of the above inequality is fixed and the LHS is 
decreasing in τ  and increasing in  . 1
s
t w +  
 Proof.   Note that 
s
t w is predetermined in period  , 1 + t  and  . 1 0 < < β  
  If the return to one unit of efficiency,  ,
s w  increases with time (Step 1), whereas 
the rate of tax,  , τ  is fixed, the LHS of (20) increases with time. It assures that the 
increasing LHS of (20) will once exceed the fixed RHS of that equation. This intersection 
between the LHS and the RHS of (20) specifies the point where inequality (19) turns into 
equality. This point is crucial in the story. When inequality (19) is reversed, the offspring 
of the local unskilled find it lucrative to invest in education, acquire human capital, and 
switch to the skilled status. The redistribution policy, however, postpones the date of the 
switch.  
  The negative effect of the redistribution in favor of the minority individuals on the 
local unskilled is double. First, taxation decreases their potential after-tax income in the 
skilled sector thereby directly reducing the profitability of investment in human capital. 
Second, through its negative effect on the aggregate human capital stock, it decreases the 
rate of growth in the return to efficiency labor thereby distorting the very mechanism that 
eventually makes the acquisition of human capital lucrative for the offspring of the 
unskilled parents.
8 
  This effect of the redistribution in favor of minorities may thus provide a purely 
economic explanation for inter-ethnic tensions observed in modern societies without 
referring to the popular racial argument. Moreover, although the burden of taxation is not 
levied on the unskilled, the effect of redistribution on the offspring of the local unskilled 
                                                  
8 Moreover, given the optimal fertility choice among the skilled (Eq. 11), if the tax rate is higher than  




t w E r w + − + − = δ β θ τ  taxation may turn the growth of the return to efficiency labor to 
negative, thereby forcing the offspring of the local unskilled to remain unskilled forever.    14
is in a sense stronger than the effect on the offspring of the skilled, who by assumption 
always acquire education.  This may explain why the negative sentiments toward several 
minorities are particularly strong among less prosperous segments of the local population, 
as has been widely established empirically (e.g., Bauer et al, 2000; Scheve and Slaughter, 
2001; Dustmann and Preston, 2001; 2006; 2007; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). 
 
 2.6.3.   Step3:    The Offspring of Minority Unskilled Parents 
Proceed now to the offspring of the minority unskilled. As long as the following 
inequality holds, they do not invest in human capital: 
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Once this inequality is reversed (or turns into equality), children of the minority unskilled 
parents choose to switch to skilled status. 
  As one can immediately observe, their decision directly depends on the transfer 
payments they receive. From Eq. (21), the critical value of the subsidy sufficiently high 
to prevent them from switching to skilled status is 
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If the return in the skilled sector grows over time (Step1), Eq. (22) implies that the critical 
value of the transfer that prevents the minority unskilled from acquiring education 
increases with time. 
 Proof.   Note that 
s
t w is predetermined in period  , 1 + t  and  . 1 0 < < β  
  Consider now the behavior of the transfers they actually receive. In Section 2.5 it 
has been shown that the number of the minority recipients increases faster than the 
number of the contributing local skilled. If the rate of increase in 
s w  is not too fast, 
transfer payments per capita must thus go down until the point when it becomes lucrative 
for the unskilled to acquire education, switch to the skilled status and increase the tax    15
base.
9 Thereafter, due to the higher fertility among the minority recipients, the per-capita 
transfers decrease again. Therefore, at some point the transfers they actually receive and 
the critical value of the subsidy (Eq. 22) must intersect. At this point, when the offspring 
of the minority unskilled choose to acquire education, the redistribution is abolished and 
the economy returns to the undistorted growth path. 
  Proceed now to the dynamics of the minority fertility. Because the minority's 
over-fertility is a result of the redistribution, it follows the same dynamic path as the 
transfer payments do. Namely, at the point when the redistribution starts, the minority 
fertility becomes higher than its natural rate and remains higher until the end of the 
redistribution, although it declines along with the per-capita transfers. At the same time, 
fertility among the contribution local skilled is lower than its natural level. The fertility 
gaps disappear only once the redistribution is abolished. 
 
 3.   Conclusion 
This article analyzes income redistribution in the inter-ethnic context. I have used a 
growth model with endogenous fertility to show that income redistribution in favor of 
less prosperous ethnic minorities raises fertility among the unskilled minority recipients, 
lowers fertility among the contributing local skilled, slows human capital accumulation, 
and reduces the per-capita output growth. The analysis also demonstrates that income 
redistribution, although financed by taxes levied on the wealthier local skilled, generates 
a mechanism that works strongly against another weak segment of society – the local 
unskilled. The negative effect of redistribution on the local unskilled is double. First, 
taxation directly decreases their potential after-tax income in the skilled sector. Second, it 
reduces the rate of increase in the return to efficiency labor thereby distorting the very 
mechanism that eventually makes the acquisition of human capital lucrative for the 
offspring of the unskilled parents. As a consequence, the switch of the local poor to the 
skilled status is postponed and as a result that they are unnecessarily trapped in poverty 
for a longer period of time.  
                                                  
9 Notice that a single jump of the transfers up due to a momentary switch of all local unskilled to skilled 
status is a result of the assumption that all local unskilled individuals are alike. Imposing some moderate 
heterogeneity in the u-group will replace this peak with a high constant segment.     16
This may provide a purely economic explanation for the existence of antipathy 
toward minorities, especially, among less educated segments of the local society. On the 
society-wide level, the analysis also suggests that reductions in the size of redistribution 
helps to slacken the negative pressure on educational incentives among the locals thereby 
increasing the supply of skilled labor and stimulating economic growth. 
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